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Abstract 
Developers of intelligent tutoring systems would like to know what human tutors do and which 
activities are responsible for their success in tutoring.  We addressed these questions by 
comparing episodes where tutoring does and does not cause learning.  Approximately 125 
hours of tutorial dialog between expert human tutors and physics students were analyzed to see 
what features of the dialog were associated with learning.  Successful learning appears to 
require that the student reach an impasse.  When students were not at an impasse, learning was 
uncommon regardless of the tutorial explanations employed.  On the other hand, once students 
were at an impasse, tutorial explanations were sometimes associated with learning.  Moreover, 
for different types of knowledge, different types of tutorial explanations were associated with 
learning different types of knowledge. 
 
Introduction   2
In principle, advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) should make it easy to build tutoring systems that 
emulate human tutors.  However, it is not yet clear what human tutors do.  Although an initial picture exists due 
to existing studies, one goal of this research is to add more detail to this picture.  We will argue that it makes 
sense to view tutoring as a sequence of learning opportunities, where a learning opportunity is a brief episode 
wherein the student and tutor apply one principle of physics to move the problem solving forward or discuss a 
principle, typically after the problem has been solved.  If the student has already mastered this particular 
principle, then they simply apply it.  However, if the student is unfamiliar with the principle or only partially 
familiar with it, then the student and tutor struggle together with the dual objectives of getting the student to 
understand the principle and applying it to the problem.  Although the learning opportunities for two different 
principles are often quite dissimilar, the learning opportunities for the same principle are often quite similar.  For 
instance, tutors in our study tended to use the same explanations for a principle over and over.   
A learning opportunity is only an opportunity to learn.  Some learning opportunities seem to result in no 
learning. Thus, the second objective of this research is to characterize the differences between successful and 
unsuccessful learning opportunities.  In particular, we tested whether (a) learning is more probable when the 
student reaches an impasse—i.e., makes an error or gets stuck; (b) tutorial explanations have any impact; and 
(c) mentioning a problem solving goal during a learning opportunity increases learning.    These hypotheses are a 
first step toward characterizing which kinds of learning opportunities lead to success and which lead to failure.  
This information is critically important for the design of tutoring systems and other instruction. 
Before explaining these research objectives in more detail, some background is required.  In particular, the 
central concept of a learning opportunity must be carefully defined. 
The type of tutoring being studied: Coached problem solving   3
The dictionary defines tutoring as teaching with one student per teacher.  Just as there are many different 
kinds of classroom teaching, so too are there many kinds of tutoring.  The characteristics of tutoring probably 
depend on factors such as the material being taught, the student’s prior knowledge and the tutor’s pedagogical 
objectives, practices and knowledge.  This paper is concerned with tutoring where:  
¤  The students are learning how to solve mathematical, scientific or technical problems that (a) require 
multiple observable actions, such as writing equations or making tests with a voltage meter, and (b) 
take many minutes to solve.  Such learning is often called cognitive skill acquisition (VanLehn, 
1996). 
¤  The students have already learned some basic principles of the domain and have been introduced to the 
problem solving process.  In terms of Anderson’s three stages of cognitive skill acquisition (Anderson, 
1982; VanLehn, 1996), the students are in the second stage.  They are neither total novices who are 
unable to solve a single problem (stage 1) nor advanced students who are just improving their speed 
and reducing the probability of unintentional errors (stage 3).  Stage 2 students still make errors caused 
by missing or incorrect knowledge, and they require help in order to solve some problems.  
¤  The tutoring sessions consist of a sort of asymmetric collaboration where the tutor helps the student as 
the student solves the problem (as opposed to the student solving the problem, then showing the 
solution to the tutor for critiquing).  This is often called coached problem solving (Shute & Psotka, 
1996). 
Perhaps due to the academic and economic importance of cognitive skills, many studies of coached problem 
solving have been conducted (Anderson, Farrell, & Saurers, 1985; Chi, 1996; Fox, 1993; Frederiksen, Roy, & 
Bedard, submitted; Heffernan, 2001; Hume, Michael, Rovick, & Evens, 1996; Lepper, Woolverton, Mumme,   4
& Gurtner, 1993; McArthur, Stasz, & Zmuidzinas, 1990; Merrill, Reiser, Merrill, & Landes, 1995; Moore, 
1993; Porayska-Pomsta, Mellish, & Pain, 2000; Putnam, 1987; Schoenfeld, Gamoran, Kessel, & Leonard, 
1992; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976 ) and reviewed (Merrill, Reiser, Ranney, & Trafton, 1992; Shute & 
Psotka, 1996).  Several commonalties have emerged. 
First, most of the tutorial dialog talks about steps in solving the problem, as opposed to general facts or 
principles in the problem domain, or metacognitive discussions of the students knowledge.  Moreover, the 
sequential and hierarchical structure of problem solving steps determines the sequential and hierarchical structure 
of the dialog to a large degree (see especially Frederiksen et al., submitted).  Here for illustration is a short a 
hypothetical tutorial dialog for a classic cognitive skill, algebraic equation solving, adapted from dialogs analyzed 
by Neil Heffernan (2001): 
1.  Tutor: Why don’t you try problem 5 [points to 7–2x=5x] 
2.  Student: [writes 5x=5x] 
3.  Tutor: Umm... 
4.  Student: That looks funny. 
5.  Tutor: Yep.  Better think again. 
6.  Student: [pauses 10 seconds] 
7.  Tutor: Suppose you were evaluating 7–2x and x was 3 [writes 7–2x and x=3].  How would you do it? 
8.  Student: 2 times 3 is 6, and 7 minus 6 is 1.  
9.  Tutor: Right.  You did the multiplication first.  You didn’t do 7 minus 2 is 5, THEN multiply by 3 
[points to the numbers as she mentions them].  So can you simplify 7–2x to 5x? 
10. Student: I guess not.   5
11. Tutor: Right.  So how are  you going to solve that equation? 
12. Student: [Crosses out 5x=5x. Writes 7–2x=5x then 7=5x–2x] 
13. Tutor: That’s better, but check your signs. 
14. Student: Oops.  [writes 7=5x+2x] 
15. Tutor: Good! 
16. Student: [writes 7=7x] 
17. Student: [writes x = 1] 
18. Tutor: Excellent.  
Much of this dialog is about the first step in the solution, which the student finally writes correctly at line 14.  The 
other steps are written without difficulties by the student.  Although the discussion of operator precedence at 
lines 7 through 9 could be considered a digression because it is not directly addressing a step in the solution, it 
was clearly done as part of a tutorial teaching tactic (called the concrete articulation strategy by Heffernan).  
Most tutorial dialogues are just like this in that they stick closely to the steps in the solution.   
A second common finding is that most tutors keep students on a correct solution path.  If students make an 
error and don’t detect it immediately themselves, the tutor almost always points the error out, sometimes just by 
pausing or saying “Umm...” as in line 3 above (see especially Fox, 1993; Merrill et al., 1995).  Although tutors 
seem to give immediate feedback naturally, some tutors deliberately delay feedback until a “quiet” period in the 
problem solving.  For instance, Rovick and Michael, two often-studied expert cardiophysiology tutors, often 
deliberately delay their feedback, but even they will fall back on immediate feedback when students appear to 
be having trouble (Cho, Michael, Rovick, & Evens, 2000).     6
In summary, there is a consensus among investigators that, as Merrill et al. (1992, p. 300) put it, coached 
problems solving “can be viewed as a collaborative problem-solving effort, with each party contributing to the 
solutions,” except that the tutor ensures that the solution does not stray very far from a correct solution path.  
Although a consensual picture of coached problem solving has emerged, it is not very detailed.  Much more 
work is needed in order to get an understanding of tutoring that is detailed enough to constrain the design of 
intelligent tutoring systems.  One goal of this research is to add some more detail to the emerging picture of 
coached problem solving.   Thus, we studied college students being tutored with expert tutors. 
A cognitive task analysis of what the students should learn 
The task domain studied here is a kind of physics problem solving that involves algebra and trigonometry 
but not calculus.  Such problem solving is common in introductory college physics courses and advanced high 
school physics courses.  A typical problem and its solution are shown at the top of Figure 1.  The problem 
consists of a diagram and a statement, “The weight W1 in the picture is 300 N.  Find T1, T2, T3 and W2.”  
The solution process involves drawing vector diagrams and writing equations (shown in the bottom of Figure 1).   
A competent student can solve such a problem in around 10 minutes, but the average student spends much 
longer.  The multi-step and multi-minute nature of the solution are common features of all cognitive skills.  
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
Physics problem solving has been studied often in both AI and cognitive psychology.  AI problem solvers 
have been written to explore various cognitive task analyses (Bundy, Byrd, Luger, Mellish, & Palmer, 1979; de 
Kleer, 1975; McDermott & Larkin, 1978; Novak & Araya, 1980).  Machine learning programs have shown 
how physics skill can be acquired from studying examples and solving problems (Elio & Scharf, 1990; VanLehn 
& Jones, 1993a, 1993b; VanLehn, Jones, & Chi, 1992).  The differences between expert and novice physics   7
problem solvers have been studied (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 
1980; Priest & Lindsay, 1992) and modeled (Elio & Scharf, 1990; Larkin, 1981; Priest & Lindsay, 1992).  It 
was in this task domain that the self-explanation effect was first uncovered (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & 
Glaser, 1989) and modeled (Reimann & Schult, 1993; Reimann, Wichmann, & Schult, 1993; VanLehn et al., 
1992).  
Although each of these works uses a different cognitive task analysis, they all seem to divide the knowledge 
required for physics problem solving into two types: 
¤  Operational versions of the basic physics principles (e.g., Newton’s laws). 
¤  Knowledge about how to apply those principles in order to solve specific problems. 
There is substantial agreement among the researchers not only on this division, but also on what the operational 
versions of the basic principles are.  For instance, the physical law W=m*g appears prominently in all textbooks 
of physics.  An operational version of it is: “If B is a body that is close to planet P, then W=m*g, where W is 
the magnitude of the force on B due to gravity, m is B’s mass and g is the gravitational constant of planet P.”  
What makes this version of it operational is that it includes the conditions for the applicability of the law and the 
definition of its symbols.  All the fundamental laws in the textbooks are easily converted to operational versions. 
Some problem solutions require operational versions of “principles” that do not appear in the textbook.  
For instance, one such tacit principle is, “If two objects move together, then they can be treated as a single 
body.”  Although physicists would certainly not accord the same status to such tacit principles as they do to 
Newton’s law and other principles that do appear in textbooks, the model-builders mentioned earlier accord all 
the operational principles essentially the same role in problem solving and they use the same formal 
representation for all operational principles.   8
Computational studies indicate that some kind of knowledge beyond the operational principles is used by 
human solvers.  If an AI problem solver has only the operational principles, then it must search extensively in 
order to find a solution even if its knowledge of the operational principles is flawless and complete.  For 
instance, if the solver uses the general-purpose method called “working forwards,” wherein it starts with the 
given information in the problem and augments it by applying operational principles, then it will often produce 
equations that are useless for deriving the particular quantity that the problem seeks.  On the other hand, if the 
solver applies the “working backwards” method, wherein it starts from the sought quantity and works 
backwards toward the givens, then it will sometimes travel down dead end paths, producing useless equations 
before connecting to the givens.  In contrast to AI problem solvers, students who have learned how to solve 
physics problems seldom produce useless equations.  Clearly, they learned more than just the operational 
principles which are applied by general purpose methods such as forward or backward search.  This extra 
knowledge tells them which principles to apply and which to ignore. 
Although researchers agree that some kind of extra knowledge beyond the operational principles is 
required, there is little consensus on how to represent it.  Some researchers favor case-based representations 
(Elio & Scharf, 1990; Reimann & Schult, 1993; Reimann et al., 1993).  Others favor schema-based 
representations (Bundy et al., 1979; Chi et al., 1981; Larkin, 1983; Larkin, 1981).   Others prefer finer-grained 
search control knowledge (VanLehn & Jones, 1993a; VanLehn et al., 1992).  All these studies involve building 
computational models and comparing them to protocols of human problem solving.  Although one can 
sometimes discriminate among proposed knowledge representations by considering how they could be learned, 
all these researchers have also built models of how their extra knowledge is learned from problem solving 
experience.  Thus, there is as yet no consensus on how the extra knowledge is represented.   9
However, one small point that all researchers agree upon is that this extra knowledge is responsible for 
managing problem-solving goals, where a goal is the student’s intention or commitment to do certain actions that 
lead to a certain state (Pollack, 1990).  For instance, typical physics problem solving goals are to draw vectors 
for all the forces acting on a certain object, or to determine the value of a certain variable.  Since there is no 
consensus on what this extra knowledge is except that it involves goals, let us call it goal-management 
knowledge in order to distinguish it from the operational versions of the principles.   
In short, there is agreement that the knowledge required to solve physics problems consists of operational 
principles and goal-management knowledge.  There is agreement on what the operational principles are, but 
there is no agreement on what the goal-management knowledge is.   
However, these authors do agree that the knowledge required for solving physics problems is only a small 
fraction of the total knowledge that physics students should learn.  For instance, consider the operational 
principle, “If there is a force F1 acting on body X due to body Y, then there is also a force F2 acting on body Y 
due to body X.  The forces are called a ‘reaction pair,’ and they have equal magnitudes and opposite 
directions.”  This is an operational version of Newton’s third law, which is usually stated, “For every force, 
there is an equal and opposite reaction force.”  To be fully competent, students must understand that the 
operational version is in fact a version of Newton’s third law, that the law was first formulated by Issac Newton, 
and that Newton’s laws are empirical principles that are supported by countless experiments.  In fact, deeper 
reflection on the third law might entail realizing that one force does not cause the other force, but instead they 
are the same thing viewed from two different perspectives.  In short, fully understanding the concept of reaction 
forces requires more than mastering this one operational principle.  This illustrates that the operational principles 
are only a fraction of the total knowledge of physics.      10
It also illustrates the dual relationship of concepts and principles.  That is, concepts like “reaction force 
pair” are mentioned by operational principles and other pieces of knowledge, so mastering a concept means 
understanding all the principles, empirical findings, history and other knowledge that mention that concept.  
A major advantage of choosing physics as a task domain is that there is at least some agreement on how to 
analyze the knowledge required for solving problems, namely, that it consists of operational versions of 
principles and goal-management knowledge.  However, it should be mentioned again that these two kinds of 
knowledge are only a part of the overall knowledge required of competent physics students. 
Objectives of the study 
To focus this research, we examine on how students learn operational versions of principles and ignore 
their acquisition of goal management knowledge.  Since we will seldom have occasion to talk about principles in 
other than their operational form, we will start using “principle” to mean the operational version of the principle. 
As a second simplification, we assume that each principle is learned independently of the other principles 
and of the goal management knowledge.  For instance, if the tutor and the student are not talking about 
Newton’s second law or using it even implicitly, then it is unlikely that the student’s understanding of Newton’s 
second law will be influenced by the conversation.   The independence assumption is probably only partially 
true.   We adopt it in order to simplify the analysis.  If principles are learned independently and we are trying to 
account for how the student learned a certain principle, we need only look at the episodes in the tutoring session 
where that principle is being discussed or applied.   For instance, if we want to understand why a student failed 
to learn Newton’s third law, we need only analyze the transcripts where it was being discussed or applied, and 
we can ignore discussions of goals and other principles.     11
An episode where a principle is being discussed or applied is called a learning opportunity for that 
principle.  It is easy to identify the learning opportunities for a principle.  A coder who knows physics can see 
explicit discussions of the principle in the transcripts, and can infer applications of the principle during periods of 
silence by seeing what equations and vectors the student writes.  Although the tutoring certainly presents 
opportunities for all kinds of learning, we will use the term learning opportunity only for episodes that could 
increase the student’s knowledge of a principle. 
To summarize, we view the tutorial dialog as a sequence of learning opportunities interspersed with 
discussion of other topics.  Each learning opportunity addresses one principle, and there may be more than one 
learning opportunity per principle.  A fairly complete picture of how a principle is learned can be obtained by 
analyzing just the learning opportunities for that principle.  
Given these simplifications, the objectives of the study can be stated more precisely.  The first objective is 
to add detail to our picture of coached problem solving.  Although we already know something about its overall 
structure (e.g., that the dialogue follows a correct solution path, and has the same sequential and hierarchical 
structure as that path), we do not know much about what occurs during learning opportunities.   Just as different 
problems have different solution paths, we expect that the learning opportunities for different principles might 
have different structures.  Thus, we collected learning opportunities for each of 5 principles, and determined 5 
structures, one for each principle.  These are presented informally in section 5.  
The second objective of the study is to determine what features of learning opportunities were associated 
with learning.  That is, for each of several principles and several students, we first determined whether that 
student acquired the principle during the tutoring or not, then we collected all the learning opportunities the 
student had for that principle and coded those episodes of the dialogue.  Using three different ways of   12
aggregating these data (presented in sections 4, 5 and 6, respectively), we looked for statistically reliable 
associations between the codes and the outcome: whether the relevant principle was learned or not.  
Methods 
Subjects 
Two experienced adult physics tutors were recruited.  Both had advanced degrees in physics and had 
served as assistants in multiple physics courses. 
The tutees were 42 students recruited from the University of Pittsburgh’s calculus-based introductory 
physics course.  All had been taught kinematics and dynamics earlier in the semester, so these tutoring sessions 
were partly a review for them.  Students were compensated for their participation with extra course credit and 
money. 
Materials 
Five physics problems were developed from problems used in earlier studies and pilot tested on advanced 
high-school students.  The problems involved only straight-line kinematics and dynamics, which are the first two 
topics taught in introductory physics courses.  Figure 1 shows one of the problems used. 
The 5 physics problems were analyzed in order to find out what principles were required for to solve them 
correctly.  The physics principles are similar to the ones used in Cascade (VanLehn et al., 1992), a 
computational model of cognitive skill acquisition.   Cascade was successfully evaluated by comparing its 
reasoning to thousands of lines of protocol data.  Not only did the subjects’ reasoning correspond to the 
reasoning generated by the principles (VanLehn & Jones, 1993b), but their learning events also corresponded 
to learning of individual principles (VanLehn, 1999).  Since the principles used in this study are similar to the   13
ones used in Cascade, it is plausible that these are indeed the principles that students learned and applied.  As 
mentioned earlier, all models of physics cognition have included principles in their knowledge representation, 
and the particular principles they included are similar to the ones we used.  This is not surprising, given that most 
of the principles are presented in physics textbooks, albeit in non-operational form. 
Based on the analysis of the training problems, a test was developed whose items were designed to 
determine if a student had learned a particular principle.  Each test item presented a situation where the principle 
should apply, and posed a goal that matched the principle.  For instance, if the operational principle is “If there 
is a taut string or string-like object attached to a body, then it exerts a tension force on the body,”  then one test 
item could be:  
Suppose a satellite is being reeled into the space shuttle by a thin, nearly massless string.  Suppose we 
idealize the situation and treat it as just 3 interacting particles: the satellite, the string and the space 
shuttle. Please draw all the forces acting on these bodies, and explain why each exists. 
If the student has mastered the principle, then she should draw a tension force acting on the satellite and 
another tension force acting on the space shuttle.  This same test item can also be used for testing knowledge of 
reaction forces.  Such test items are simply steps that would occur during normal problem solving.  However, 
the item is written to clearly articulate both the inferences that would normally have occurred before this step 
(e.g., that the satellite, string and shuttle should be idealized as particles) and a goal for the step (e.g., to draw all 
the forces on all the bodies).   Thus, all the cues required for retrieval and selection of the principle are explicitly 
present in the problem statement.  This means that the student’s knowledge of the principle can be revealed 
even if the student knows no other principle.  On a more conventional test, ignorance of one principle might   14
suppress the cues needed for retrieval and selection of a different principle.  Thus, our test was designed to 
measure knowledge of each principle independently.   
Procedure 
The students took a pre-test, solved all 5 problems with the tutor’s help, then took an identical post-test.  
The tests took about a half-hour each, and the tutoring session took about 3 or 4 hours.  For most students, all 
this occurred on the same day (but different days for different subjects), so they took breaks periodically.  The 
tutoring sessions were audio-taped and later transcribed. 
In order to increase the applicability of this study to computer-based tutoring, the students solved physics 
problems with a computer program that allowed entering standard physics notations: vector drawings, algebraic 
equations and text.  The program was not a computer-based tutor; it acted only as a piece of paper would, 
albeit one with some domain-specific drawing tools.   
 In order to facilitate transcription, the student and tutor were placed in different rooms.  They 
communicated by phone, and the tutor watched a copy of the student’s screen but could not manipulate it.  This 
prevented them from communicating non-verbally.  If tutoring is done face-to-face, then Fox (1993) and others 
have found that gaze direction, gestures and facial expressions communicate significant information, so 
transcription and analysis of face-to-face conversations must include much more detail than transcription and 
analysis of audio-only conversations.  At any rate, neither students nor tutors found it difficult to use the linked 
screens and the phone, so the sacrifice in verisimilitude seemed to have been worth the resulting facilitation of 
transcription and the similarity to computer-based tutoring.   15
Analysis of test data 
For each student and principle, both pre-test and post-test were scored according to whether the student 
used the principle or not.  Because the test problems were designed to be solvable using only one or a few 
principles each, inter-rater agreement was high (2 coders, k=.95).   
If a subject failed to use a principle on the pre-test but used it on the post-test, the subject was said to 
“gain” that principle.  If a subject failed to use a principle on both the pre- and post-tests, then the subject was 
said to “not gain” that principle. 
Theoretical issues that motivate the coding categories 
Because our objective is to find features of learning opportunities that are associated with gains, we chose 
coding categories (features) for which there is some reason to expect an associate with gain.  We could not 
include all such features, so this section motivates the particular features we chose to examine. 
Impasses 
In earlier work on cognitive skill acquisition without the aid of a tutor, it was found that that learning was 
often associated with impasses (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Carroll & Kay, 1988; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; 
VanLehn, 1987, 1990, 1999; VanLehn & Jones, 1993b; VanLehn et al., 1992).   A non-operational definition 
of an impasse is that it occurs when a student realizes that he or she is lacking a complete understanding of a 
specific piece of knowledge.  However, because impasses are usually coded from verbal protocols, a more 
operational definition is that an impasse occurs when a student gets stuck, detects an error, or does an action 
correctly but expresses uncertainty about it.  The basic idea is that an impasse motivates a student to take an   16
active role in constructing a better understanding of the principle.  The student may interrogate memory, objects 
in the local environment (e.g., a textbook), or nearby people.   
In contrast, a non-impasse occurs under three conditions.  Either the student applies a piece of knowledge 
correctly with no signs of uncertainty, or the student makes an error that is never detected, or the student 
somehow avoids applying the piece of knowledge, e.g., by getting someone else to apply it.   
In the tutoring context, almost all errors are detected, so that leaves the following coding categories: 
•  The tutor applies the principle before even giving the student a chance. 
•  The student tries to apply the principle and reaches an impasse by either  
o  applying the principle incorrectly, or  
o  getting stuck and either asking for help or pausing a long time, or  
o  applying the principle correctly while expressing doubt or asking for confirmation. 
•  The student applies the principle correctly with no questions, pauses or other signs of uncertainty or 
confusion. 
Our hypothesis is that a student’s understanding of the principle usually increases if the student reaches an 
impasse.   In particular, if the tutor applies the principle, then the student’s state of understanding is usually 
unchanged, even though the tutor might accompany the demonstration with considerable explanation.  On the 
other hand, if the student applies the principle correctly, then the student apparently already understands it 
sufficiently well, so there is usually no further increase in understanding even though such practice tends to cause 
increases in speed and accuracy (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981).  Because there are already well documented 
cases where understanding increased with no sign of impasses (Jones & VanLehn, 1994; Siegler & Jenkins,   17
1989; VanLehn, 1991), we expect this hypothesis to emerge as a probabilistic association rather than an 
inviolate law of learning. 
Explanations 
Let us use “explanation” for both discussion of the principle itself, either in its generic form or its 
operational form, or discussion of how to apply it to the current problem state.  An explanation can be 
produced collaboratively, with contributions by both the student and the tutor.  In particular, tutors often try to 
elicit knowledge of the principle by mentioning a small part of it.  For instance, if the principle is Newton’s third 
law, then a hint such as “Are there any reaction force pairs here?” would count as an explanation because it 
mentions a part of the principle. (The tutor probably hopes that the student will fill in the rest.)  On the other 
hand, merely giving the student feedback (e.g., “Not quite.  Try again.”) would not count as explanation, 
because it mentions no part of the principle or its application.  Eliciting a goal (e.g., “Are you trying to find 
forces on the block?”) usually would not count as explanation, but it could if the elicitation contained some 
information about the principle (e.g., “I’m assuming you are applying Newton’s law, so are you trying to find 
forces on the block?”).  In short, the definition of explanation is based on the content of a discourse segment 
rather than the identity of the speakers uttering it or the segment’s function in the problem solving.  
In addition to mentioning the principle or its parts, tutors sometime explain principles by deriving them, 
either mathematically or qualitatively.  For instance, suppose the principle is, “if velocity is constant, then 
acceleration is zero.”  The tutor might start out by asking, “What is the definition of acceleration?” and hoping 
that the student will respond correctly with “Change in velocity divided by duration.”  The tutor may then assert 
the second step of the derivation and elicit the third step by asking, “So if there is no change in velocity, as is the 
case here, what is the acceleration?”  On the other hand, simply encouraging the student to derive the principle   18
would not count as an explanation, because it mentions no part of the principle nor its derivation.  Chi et al. 
(2001) call these “content-free prompts.” 
A major issue in the literature is whether learning is best accomplished with no explanation, student-
generated explanation or tutor-generated explanation.  When computer-based tutors told the student that they 
had made an error, giving some explanation was better than giving no explanation, but the benefit was 
surprisingly small (Anderson, Conrad, & Corbett, 1989; McKendree, 1990).   In studies with human tutors, it 
appears that student-generated explanations (self-explanations) are more effective than tutor-generated 
explanations (instructional explanations) (e.g., Brown & Kane, 1988; Chi, 1996), Moreover, having students 
self-explain but ask for instructional explanations when they reach impasses seems even better than self-
explanation alone (Renkl, 2001).   This would suggest the following ranking: no explanation causes the least 
learning, followed by tutor-generated explanations, then self-explanations, and finally by self-explanation with 
tutorial explanation as backup.   However, when Chi et al. (2001) directly compared tutoring that contained 
mostly tutor-generated explanation with tutoring that contained mostly student-generated explanation, they found 
that students learned equally well in both conditions.  Given this recent interest in tutorial explanations, many of 
our codes quantify how much explanation was given and by whom.   
Goal setting 
When an intelligent tutoring system gives a sequence of hints to a student, the first hint usually states a goal, 
such as “Try drawing the acceleration of the car,” that the tutor thinks is appropriate at this moment (Corbett, 
McLaughlin, & Scarpinatto, 2000; Shute & Psotka, 1996).  Such goal-setting hints should be useful both 
because they insure that the student and the tutor are working on the same goal, and because the goal is a 
retrieval cue and a selection cue for the principle that the student should apply, so getting it into the student’s   19
focus of attention during a learning opportunity ought to encourage the formation of useful associations.  Not 
surprisingly, such goal setting hints sometimes work, and no further hints are needed in order for the student to 
do a correct action (Aleven & Koedinger, 2000).   Even if they do not work, they set the stage for discussion of 
the principle, and thus are likely to increase the chance that the student will learn the principle.  As this logic 
would predict, McKendree (1990) found that hints that mentioned goals are marginally more effective than hints 
that do not.  This suggests that human tutors should also mention goals, either by telling them to the students as 
many tutoring systems do or, more likely, by eliciting them from students by, for instance, just asking them, 
“what are you trying to do here?”  
One existing analysis of human tutoring examined whether human tutors mentioned or elicited goals.  
McArthur et  al. (1990) found that only one of their three tutors mentioned goals.  Moreover, that tutor’s 
discussion of goals varied in a predictable way.  Initially, the tutor mentioned goals frequently (“modeling” the 
goal management, according to McArthur et al.) but the frequency of goal mentioning declined rapidly (“fading,” 
according to McArthur et al.).  This pattern led them to speculate that the reason that the other two tutors did 
not mention goals is that those tutors felt that their students had already mastered the relevant goal management 
knowledge, and thus goals did not need to be mentioned. 
At any rate, we suspect that mentioning or eliciting goals could possibly help learning in some cases, so we 
coded for them in analyzing the transcripts.   Thus, the three major categories of codes were: 
q Was the first application of the principle done by the tutor, an impasse by the student, or no 
problem for the student? 
q Was the principle explained in some way by either the student or the tutor? 
q Was an appropriate goal mentioned by either the student or the tutor?   20
In addition to these three major categories, we included a few codes (e.g., the number of words in the learning 
opportunity) that did not fit into any of these categories. 
A preview of the three analyses 
We made three attempts to determine what features of tutorial dialog were associated with learning.  All 
three used coding categories that were motivated by the theoretical issues described above.  That is, we coded 
learning opportunities for impasses, explanations and goals.  In the first analysis, regression produced some 
interesting patterns, but did not reveal the impact of impasses, explanations and goals on learning.  The problem 
seemed to be that we were treating all learning opportunities the same even when they addressed different 
principles. 
The second attempt avoided this problem by selecting 5 principles and analyzing their learning opportunities 
separately.  This allowed us to increase the specificity of the codes, as well as to add some new codes to 
address a few other issues that have been raised in the literature, namely: 
q If the student made an error, did the explanation focus on the error, on the action that should have 
been done, or both?  Sleeman et al. (1989) showed that tutoring on the correct action is just as 
good as first explaining why an error is wrong then tutoring on the correct action. 
q At what level of generality was the discussion?  Studies of analogical transfer indicate that having 
the instruction describe the principle in general terms, as opposed to letting students form those 
generalizations themselves, facilitated students’ application of the principle later (Catrambone, 
1994a).   21
q If the principle is mathematical, does the explanation consist of a derivation of it or just restating it in 
words?  Studies of analogical transfer indicate that instructions that contain derivations facilitate 
transfer (Catrambone, 1994b). 
Although this second attempt revealed several interesting patterns, it still did not address our main questions 
about the effects of impasses, explanation and goals.  The problem was that the learning opportunities for 
different principles were so different from each other that sometimes there would be zero occurrences of an 
event for one principle, when that event was common with another.  These zeros prevented certain trends from 
emerging in the data analysis. 
Thus, our third attempt involved formulating these trends as hypotheses and testing them using data from all 
5 principles at once.  This succeeded in revealing how impasses affect learning in this context, although the 
effects of explanations and goals still remain unresolved. 
  First analysis: What general features of learning opportunities correlate with 
gain? 
Our first analysis was simply to find features that correlated with gain regardless of which principle was involved.   
Analysis procedure 
Since we could not feasibly analyze all 42 students, we chose a subset of 8 that would maximize the 
contrast between effective and ineffective learners.  For each of the 2 tutors, we selected for analysis 2 students 
with high gains and 2 students with low gains, balancing for pre-test score and gender.  
To collect learning opportunities, we first located each principle that was missed on the pre-test.  Different 
students missed different principles, of course.  A total of 66 principles were missed on the pre-test (i.e., each   22
student missed about 8 principles), so there were 66 student-principle pairs for analysis.  Of these 66 pairs, 23 
were gains (i.e., the student got the principle right on the post-test) and 43 were no-gains.  Thus, the challenge 
was to find features of the learning opportunities that were present for the 23 gains and absent for the 43 no-
gains.  
For each of the 66 subject-principle pairs, all learning opportunities were located in the protocols.  An 
episode was classified as a learning opportunity if the tutor and student either discussed the principle and/or one 
of them applied the principle.    
Insert Table 1 about here. 
The learning opportunities were analyzed using the codes shown in Table 1.  As discussed earlier, we 
believe insights into learning can be obtain by analyzing learning opportunities in terms of impasses, explanations 
and goals.  However, there were very few explicit comments about goals, so we did not bother to code for 
them in this analysis.  Thus, Table 1 is divided into sections for codes concerning what initiated the event (e.g., 
an impasse), codes concerning the content of the explanations and who articulated that content, and 
miscellaneous codes. 
Objective codes (e.g., number of words) were scored by one coder.  Subjective codes were judged by 
two coders.  Most codes were moderately reliable (k > .68 for categorical codes; r > .69 for numerical codes), 
and those that were not reliable were discussed and re-coded.   
Because one of our research questions is “what features distinguish effective learning opportunities from 
ineffective ones,” the unit of analysis should be learning opportunities.  However, if a particular principle is 
discussed several times by the student and the tutor, then there are several learning opportunities for it.  
However, we only have tests at the beginning and the end, and not in between each learning opportunity.  Thus,   23
we can only determine whether a set of learning opportunities was associated with gain or no-gain of that 
principle for that student.   Thus, it was necessary to aggregate the results of the coding, which we did as 
follows: 
•  If the code was categorical (e.g., Did the student initiate the event?), we counted the number of learning 
opportunities with that code.   
•  If the code was numerical (e.g., How many misconceptions were mentioned by the student?), we 
summed over the learning opportunities.  
As a result of this aggregation, we obtained 66 data points, each bearing values for a single binary dependent 
variable (gain vs. no-gain) and multiple integer independent variables (the codes listed earlier).  
Because some data points come from the same student, albeit with different principles, it could be argued 
that they are dependent, which would complicate the statistics.  However, we are assuming that principles are 
acquired independently, as discussed earlier. 
Results 
Because the dependent variable was dichotomous, we used logistic regression.  When regressed individually, 
only 3 codes were significantly correlated with gain: 
•  Did the student perform the action without help from the tutor (r
2=.030, p=.034)? 
•  Did the student first mention the correct conclusion generated by applying the principle (r
2=.034, 
p=.026)? 
•  How many words were uttered by student and tutor together (r
2=.075, p=.004)?  Events with fewer 
words more often resulted in gain.   24
The first two codes suggest that students who do more reasoning themselves learn more, as the self-explanation 
effect suggests (Chi et al., 1989).  However, principle complexity could also explain the first two correlations.  
That is, simple, easily learned principles might be more often performed by the student without help and might 
tend to have their conclusions mentioned first by the student.  This suggested analyzing the data with the intrinsic 
difficulty of learning the principles factored out. 
Results factoring out the intrinsic difficulty of learning the principle 
Because we do not know how to measure the intrinsic difficulty of learning a principle, we used two different 
approximations: the frequency of gain of the principle and the number of key ideas underlying the principle.  
The frequency of gain of a principle is just the number of students who gain the principle among those who had 
an opportunity to gain the principle.  That is, it is the number of students who got the principle wrong on the 
pretest and right on the posttest divided by the number of  students who got the principle wrong on the pretest.   
Although frequency of gain is certainly sensitive to the intrinsic learnability of the principle, it is also sensitive 
to the pedagogical techniques that tutors have for that principle.  For instance, if two principles have the same 
intrinsic learnabilty but tutors have better explanations for one than the other, then the principles will have 
different frequencies of gain.  Thus, we also used the number of key ideas underlying a principle, which is a 
measure that depends only on the content of the principle.  The key ideas of a principle include a precise 
statement of the principle, definitions of any technical terms used in the principle and other propositions that are 
strongly related to the principle.  For instance, the following are the key ideas underlying the principle “If an 
object is moving in a straight line and slowing down, its acceleration is opposite its velocity.”  The first key idea 
is a precise statement of the principle, and the other two are definitions of concepts used in it:   25
•  If a body is moving in a straight line and its velocity is decreasing, the direction of its acceleration is 
opposite of the direction of its velocity. 
•  Average acceleration is change in velocity divided by change in time. 
•  The sign of a vector component specifies its direction relative to an axis. 
Although the exact content of the key ideas did not matter for this analysis, the number of key ideas was used as 
a crude measure of the intrinsic learnability of the principle. 
In order to factor out the learnability of principles, we first used the frequency of gain of principles as a 
measure of learnability.  When gain was regressed against both frequency of gain and each of the learning 
opportunity codes, no code was reliably associated with gain.  Interactions between the codes and frequency of 
gain were also not significantly associated with gain.  Stepwise regressions showed that only frequency of gain 
was significantly correlated with gain and it explained 45% of the variance.  In short, when difficulty is measured 
by the frequency of gain of principles, it is so strongly associated with gain that no other features of the tutorial 
dialogs reached significance after it was factored out.  This is probably due to the fact that frequency of gain 
measured not only the intrinsic difficulty of the principle but principle-specific tutorial tactics.  If it includes almost 
everything that could be expected to influence gain and we factor it out, then there is no variance left to explain 
with the codes. 
The second measure of intrinsic difficulty, number of key ideas, is based solely on the content of the 
principle and thus is probably a better measure of learnability, although clearly not perfect.  When gain was 
regressed against both the number of key ideas and each of the learning opportunity codes, only one code 
remained significantly associated with gain, namely, the number of words in the learning opportunity (r
2=.045, 
p=.015).   We examined interactions between pairs of categories that were significantly correlated with the   26
dependent measure in the earlier analysis, and found that none of the interactions were significantly associated 
with gain.  A stepwise logistic regression was performed, entering significantly correlated variables from the 
earlier analysis and their interactions, ordered by the p-values of the univariate tests from the earlier analysis.  
The selected model included the number of words (r
2=.043) followed by an interaction term (number of key 
ideas X student first mentioned the correct conclusion; r
2=.011).  Thus, when we factored out the “intrinsic 
difficulty” of the principle, the only reliable correlate of gain was the number of words uttered during the learning 
opportunities.  The fewer the words, the more likely the students were to gain.  
Discussion 
The association between verbosity and gain could be due to several factors.  It could be that our use of the 
number of key ideas to measure intrinsic learnability was not entirely accurate, and that difficult-to-learn 
principles were associated with both long discussions and lack of gain.  It could be that some event either before 
the discussion or early in it confused the student, which led to both a longer discussion and a lack of gain.  It 
could also be that when tutors offered wordy explanations, students failed to learn, as Lewis (1989) found 
(cited in Anderson, Corbett, Koedinger, & Pelletier, 1995, p. 191 ).    
Although an association with verbosity was found, other possible correlates of learning may have been 
washed out by variations in learning opportunities caused by the principles themselves.  Perhaps the activity 
during a learning opportunity depends more on the nature of the principle than on the learning strategies of the 
subjects or the tutoring strategies of the tutors.     27
Second analysis: For each principle, what features were associated with gain? 
Because we suspected that the reason we could not observe strong explanatory patterns was that our analysis 
sought a single pattern that explained gain for every principle, our next analysis examined principles separately, 
looking for features of the tutorial dialogs that explained just the gain on that principle. 
Because we needed enough learning opportunities per principle to get statistical power, we abandoned the 
laborsaving device of examining only 8 subjects and analyzed all 42 subjects.  However, we did not examine all 
principles.  We examined a principle only if 5 or more subjects gained on it and 5 or more subjects failed to gain 
on it.  These constraints were necessary in order to have enough variance to explain.  The constraints eliminated 
all but 5 principles.   
It seems plausible that there are 4 general influences on whether the student learns a particular principle: 
1.  Method: What occurred during the learning opportunities?  This influence is the one that we are 
most interested in.  Its analysis is presented below. 
2.  Content: What principle is being learned, and in particular, what is its intrinsic learnability?  By 
analyzing each principle separately, we control for this. 
3.  Teacher: Who was the tutor, and in particular, what is the overall competence of the tutor?  For 
each principle, we separately checked whether the identity of the tutors could explain the gains.  
For none of the 5 principles were gains associated with tutor (Chi-square test,  N=15, 23, 32, 25 
and 18).  
4.  Student: Who was the student, and in particular, what is the overall competence of the student?  
We also checked whether gains on a principle could be explained by the overall competence of the 
students.  For instance, for the deceleration principle discussed below, of the 15 students who   28
missed the principle on the pre-test, 8 gained and 7 did not, and the pre-test scores of the gainers 
(25.4) and non-gainers (27.1) were not significantly different (p=.57).  In fact, for none of the 5 
principles were the pre-test scores of the gainers significantly different from pre-test scores of the 
non-gainers (t-test, N=15, 23, 32, 25 and 18). 
In short, it appears that learning is associated with what occurred during the tutorial dialog, and not with 
who was involved.  Each of the sections below discusses one principle and the tutorial dialog features 
associated with its gains.  All statistical tests were done with Fisher’s exact test unless otherwise noted. 
For each principle, we begin by describing the learning opportunities themselves in some detail in order to 
put the rest of the analysis in a meaningful context. 
As discussed earlier, the codes were designed to describe the goal setting, initial application of the 
principle, and its explanation.  If a particular principle had no variance for a code (e.g., all the learning 
opportunities were initiated exactly the same way), then we usually did not include that code in the tables below, 
but instead mention the uniformity in the text.   
The Knot Principle 
Students often think that the only objects to which they should apply Newton’s law are blocks and other 
objects with mass.  However, for some problems, massless objects are the appropriate choice for the “body.”  
(Physicists use “body” to mean the object that one will apply laws to.)  A common massless object is a knot 
formed by tying together several massless strings.  Ideally, the principle to be learned is, “A massless object can 
be a body.”  However, the only massless objects used in our problems are knots, so students may have learned 
only the more specific principle, “A knot can be a body.”   29
In the training, this principle was used on a problem where two blocks are hung from a harness of 5 
massless strings that has two knots (see Figure 1).  The correct solution follows from applying Newton’s law 
once for each knot.  In the testing, the knot principle was used on a problem where two men are pulling a cart 
with a harness that has 3 strings and one knot.  Thus, students must transfer the application of the principle from 
a vertical case to a horizontal case, and from a more complex harness to a simpler one.  
Description of the knot principle’s learning opportunities 
Tutoring on the knot principle proceeded as follows.  Tutors sometimes mentioned quite early in the 
problem that there were knots at the junctions of the strings, but they did not at that time mention that knots 
could be bodies.  When they came to the part of the problem where a body needed to be chosen, they either 
explicitly stated the goal that a body must be chosen (20 cases) or did not explicitly state this (12 cases).  If the 
tutor stated that a body must be chosen, then the tutors usually also asked the student to choose the body (16 
cases).  Regardless of how the body choice was prompted, either the tutor chose the body (11 cases), the 
student chose the wrong body (14 cases), the student chose the right body (5 cases) or the student couldn’t 
choose a body (2 cases).  When the tutor chose the body, it was often indicated subtly by simply asking the 
student to draw forces on the knot.  When the student chose the wrong body, the tutor always pointed it out 
immediately.  Regardless of who chose the knot as the body and how, the tutors would sometimes explain the 
principle (13 cases).  During those explanations, they would sometimes (6 cases) state a general version of the 
principle, such as “A body should be chosen that connects objects with known properties to objects whose 
properties we seek.” 
Features associated with learning the knot principle   30
Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
Table 2 shows the codes that were used.  The following features were associated with gain:   
•  Whether a student incorrectly chose the body (14 cases) or not (18 cases).  (p=.013) 
•  Whether the tutor asked the student to choose a body (16 cases) or not (16 cases).  (p=.002) 
•  Whether the tutor stated that a body needs to be chosen (20 cases) or not (12 cases).  (p=.017) 
These features turn out to be strongly related.  Table 3 shows why.  The rows show different ways that the 
tutors prompted the goal of choosing a body.  The columns show whether the teacher applied the principle, or 
whether the student made an error, got stuck, or applied the principle correctly.  Notice that the 14 students 
who chose a body incorrectly are a subset of the 16 students whom the tutors asked to chose a body, who are 
in turn a subset of the 20 students who heard the tutor state that a body needs to be chosen.  We believe it is 
really the first feature (errors) that makes a difference.  That is, there were enough gainers in the smallest set to 
cause all three sets to be reliably associated with gains.  This interpretation is consistent with the fact that by the 
time the knot principle comes up, the tutor and student had already discussed the need to choose a body many 
times, so mentioning it one more time probably didn’t make much difference.  Thus, it is more likely that the 
gains were associated with making errors. 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
The Deceleration Principle 
The deceleration principle is “If an object is slowing down, then it is accelerating in the direction opposite its 
movement.”  During instruction, this principle was first used in a problem where an elevator was slowing down 
as it descended.  Students who knew the principle should have concluded that the elevator was accelerating   31
upwards.  On the tests, the students were asked to draw the acceleration of a truck that was slowing down 
while moving rightwards on a horizontal surface.  Students who knew the principle should have drawn a 
leftward horizontal arrow.   
A description of the deceleration principle’s learning opportunities 
All 15 students who missed the principle on the pretest initially failed during training to correctly indicate 
that the elevator’s acceleration was upward.  In all cases, the tutors noticed the error and provided remediation.  
The tutors used several different tactics to teach the principle, including these: 
•  The tutor reasoned deductively from the definitions.  In particular, the tutor usually began by asking the 
student for the definition of acceleration.  The student should answer, “Change in velocity divided by 
the duration.”  The tutor next asked the student to draw the initial velocity of the elevator, the final 
velocity, and the change in velocity.  The latter should be a short arrow pointing upwards.  The tutor 
then asked the student the direction of the elevator’s acceleration.  The student should say “Up.” 
•  The tutor reasoned by analogy.  In particular, the tutor began by saying, “Suppose I am moving north.  
What direction would you have to push me in order to slow me down?”  The student should say, 
“South.”  The tutor then asked the student, “So according to Newton’s law, what direction would my 
acceleration be?”  The student should say, “South.”  The tutor then asked the student the direction of 
the elevator’s acceleration.  The student should say, “Up.”   
•  The tutor used a Socratic approach.  If the student said the acceleration is downward, the tutor asked 
what that would do to the velocity vector.  The student should say that the velocity vector gets longer.  
The tutor asked what that would do to the elevator’s speed.  The student should say that the elevator   32
would speed up.  The tutor asked if the elevator is speeding up.  The student should realize the 
contradiction and retract the belief that the elevator is accelerating downwards. 
•  The tutor gave some kind of mild negative feedback, such as “Are you sure the acceleration is 
downwards?”  The student should then say something like, “No, I meant upwards.” 
Sometimes the tutors would try one tutorial tactic, then try a second if the first seemed not to work.  
Features associated with learning the deceleration principle 
The tactics (lines of reasoning) were coded by two coders (k=.88).  Codes are shown in Table 4.  The 
only code that was reliably associated with gain was whether the tutor stated a general version of the principle, 
namely “If a body is slowing down, the direction of its acceleration is opposite its motion” (p=.035; Coding was 
done by two coders with k=1.0.)  It was always the tutor who stated the generalization, and never the student.  
Generalization facilitated correct answering of the post-test.  Apparently, a correct answer to the vertical training 
situation (the elevator problem) was not entirely sufficient for the student to answer correctly in the horizontal 
testing situation (the truck problem).  In order to increase generalization and transfer, it appears that the tutor 
should mention the critical concepts “slowing down” and “opposite.” 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
A Kinematics Equation 
Several kinematics (time-rate-distance) equations are used in physics, and one of them is s=vot+½ at
2, where s 
is the distance an object travels, t is the duration of travel, v0 is the object’s initial velocity and a is the object’s 
acceleration.  During training, this equation was used in a problem where a block starts at rest and slides down   33
an inclined plane for 2 seconds.  It was tested by asking how far an object travels during 10 seconds when 
starting from rest and accelerating at 5 m/s
2.   
A description of the kinematics equation’s learning opportunities 
The tutorial dialogs for this principle had the following general form.  One of the students was able to 
produce a correct version of the equation.  The other 22 students either could not produce any equation (9 
cases) or produced incorrect equations (13 cases).  If a student could not produce an equation, then the tutor 
did so and sometimes justified it by deriving it from the definitions of velocity and acceleration via either calculus 
(2 cases) or algebra (1 case).  On the other hand, if the student produced an incorrect equation, the tutors 
responded in two ways:  
•  Sometimes (6 cases) the tutor explained why the student’s error was wrong.  For instance, a common 
error was to use s=vt, where v is supposed to be the average velocity but students used the final 
velocity instead.  Tutors pointed this out and suggested using the target equation instead.  In one case, 
the tutor also justified the target equation by deriving it via calculus. 
•  Sometimes (7 cases) the tutor did not explain why the student’s equation was wrong.  For instance, 
when one student used s=at
2, the tutor simply pointed out that it should be s=½at
2.  Additionally, in 4 
cases, the tutor derived the equation via calculus. 
Features associated with learning the kinematics equation 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
Table 5 shows the codes used.  Two were associated with gains.  First, if the student produced an 
incorrect equation and the tutor did not explain why it was wrong, then students rarely (in 1 of 7 cases) gained;   34
but if the tutor explained why the equation was wrong, then they usually (in 4 of 6 cases) gained, which was a 
marginally significant difference (p=.10).  This finding suggests, contrary to claims by Sleeman et al. (1989), that 
the tutor should have explained why the error was wrong, because merely correcting a mistaken equation was 
not sufficient to remedy the incorrect knowledge.  
A second code was associated with gain.  Whenever the tutors derived the target equation via calculus or 
algebra, the students never (out of 8 cases) gained whereas in the 14 cases where the tutor did not derive an 
equation mathematically, students gained in half the cases (p=.02).  Although we found that mathematical 
derivations of the equation were associated with low gains, Catrambone (1994b) found that such derivations 
improved gains.  However, his test problems could be solved by applying just part of the derivation.  In our 
case, the test problems used the same target equation as the training, so being able to apply only part of the 
derivation wasn’t necessary for solving them correctly.  Apparently, our tutors’ derivations provided no useful 
new information and may only have confused the students.  
The Compound Body Principle 
Some physics problems are easier to solve if one treats two or more objects that move together as a single 
body.  For instance, if the problem asks for the acceleration of a 40 kg boy on a 10 kg sled that is sliding down 
a hill, then it is easiest to treat the boy/sled combination as a single 50 kg body.  The compound body principle 
is, “A set of objects that move together can be considered a single body.”  In the instruction, the principle is first 
used in a problem where two blocks, one sitting on top of the other, slide down a frictionless inclined plane.  
The principle is tested in a problem where two adjacent blocks sit on a horizontal frictionless plane, and a 
horizontal force is applied to the left side of the left block.     35
Description of the compound body principle’s learning opportunities 
The tutorial dialogs had the following general form.  Because the physics problem used in the training 
actually asked, “What is the acceleration of the two-block system,” it strongly suggests that one should choose 
a compound body.  Nonetheless, 4 students mistakenly chose a single block as the body.  The other 21 
students correctly chose the two blocks as the body but 5 showed uncertainty (e.g., by asking the tutor if it was 
correct).  Regardless of how the body was chosen, the tutors would usually (23 of 25 cases) confirm that the 
two blocks should be treated as a single body and sometimes (9 cases) even explain why (e.g., because they 
have the same acceleration or because they move together). 
Features associated with learning the compound body principle 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
Table 6 shows the codes used.  Of the 6 students who gained, all made a mistake or showed uncertainty, 
whereas of the 19 students who did not gain, 16 made the correct body choice without comment.  The 
difference was significant  (p=.0005).  No other significant differences were found among the other features that 
we coded for.   
The Rotated Axes Principle 
Although Newton’s law is introduced as a vector equation, F=ma, where F and a are vectors, students are 
taught to apply it by choosing coordinate axes centered on the body, finding components of the vectors along 
each axis, and writing Newton’s law in scalar form once for each axis (see Figure 1).  The coordinate axes need 
not appear in their standard orientation, where the x-axis is horizontal and the y-axis is vertical.  They can be 
rotated.  Although different equations result from different rotations, the final answer will always be the same   36
regardless of how the axes were rotated.  Students can take advantage of this in order to simplify the equations.  
If a vector is perpendicular to an axis, then its component along that axis is zero, so it need not appear in the 
equation for that axis.  The axes can be rotated to make certain vectors perpendicular to the axis, and thus 
simplify the equations.   
The general version of the axis rotation principle is to choose axes that simplify the equations.  However, 
this version of the principle is not operational.  One would have to mentally envision the equations that would 
result from different rotations of the axes in order to determine which rotation creates the simplest equations.  
Not even experts could do that easily.  Thus, there are two more specific versions of the principle that are 
commonly used: 
•  If the sought quantity is the magnitude of a vector, such as an acceleration or a force, then rotate the 
axes so that one axis is aligned with it.  This means that the unknown will appear in only one equation. 
•  If the sought quantity is a scalar, such as mass, or there is no sought quantity, then rotate the axes so that 
the maximum number of vectors lie along axes.  If a vector lies along an axis, its magnitude will appear in 
only one equation. 
During training, the rotated axis principle was used on three problems (P2, P3 and P5).  In all three cases, 
the first version of the principle was appropriate because the sought quantities were vectors.  Tutors’ 
explanations usually stated that the axes should be rotated to align with the direction of the unknown quantity.  
Sometimes the tutors would also state that rotating the axes simplifies the equations. 
Unfortunately, the test problem required much further transfer than we had intended.  The problem 
provided several vectors without specifying which one was sought, and asked the student to draw appropriate   37
coordinate axes.  Thus, it could be solved by the second version of the rotated axes principle.  Yet that version 
was not relevant during the tutoring sessions, so there was no tutoring on it.  
Description of the rotated axes principle’s learning opportunities 
During the first problem where the rotated axis principle could be used, the tutoring proceeded as follows.  
In 12 cases, the tutor suggested rotating the axes before giving the student a chance to draw them.  In the 
remaining 6 cases, the student chose the axes and usually (4 cases) chose non-rotated ones.  However, even 
when the tutor did suggest rotating the axes before giving the student a chance to draw them, 1 of the 12 
students apparently misunderstood, because the student failed to rotate the axes even after receiving the 
suggestion.  On the other hand, if they chose correctly, they did not express uncertainty.  Regardless of how the 
axes were chosen, the tutors often (in 13 of 18 cases) mentioned the first version of the principle (“It’s generally 
a good idea to put one axis along the unknown.”).  In 4 of those 13 cases, the tutors continued by mentioning 
the general version (“That will simplify the equations.”).  There were no cases where the tutors gave the general 
explanation without giving the specific explanation.  
On the second problem where the rotated axis principle could be used, the tutor suggested rotating the 
axes before the student had a chance in only 3 cases.  In the third problem, the tutor usurped the student’s 
prerogative in only 1 case.  Thus, the tutors were fading the scaffolding, which has been observed before in 
tutoring (McArthur et al., 1990, Figure 3).   
The tutors also gave explanations somewhat less frequently on subsequent problems.  On both the second 
and third problems, they gave explanations in 10 of 18 cases, whereas they gave explanations in 13 of 18 cases 
on the first problem.   38
Features associated with learning the rotated axes principle 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
Table 7 shows the codes used.  None were associated with gain.  In particular, for each of the three 
problems, we tested whether any code for that problem was associated with gain.  We also formed codes that 
aggregated across problems, such as “Did the student make an error on any problem,” and tested their 
association with gain.  Again, no significant associations were found.  This is not too surprising, given that the 
training was on one specific version of the principle and the testing was on the other version. 
Because we had unintentionally used a far transfer problem on the test, we tried in vain to find evidence of 
learning by seeing if tutoring reduced errors during training.  We used the codes of Table 7 as independent 
variables, but took errors on the second and/or third problem as the dependent variable.  For instance, Table 8 
shows the results for whether or not making an error on the first problem is associated with making an error on 
the second problem.  The Table indicates that if the student erred on the first problem (and received 
remediation), then the student was less likely to error on the second problem.  This is the trend one would 
expect, but it did not reach significance.  Note that only 15 of the 18 students could be used in this analysis 
because for the other 3, the tutor usurped their chance of making an error on the second problem.  The use of 
subsequent errors as a dependent variable caused low N on all of the tests of association, which is probably 
why none of them reached significance.  
Insert Table 8 about here.   39
Third analysis: Generalization over principles 
Table 9 summarizes the results from the preceding analysis.  As expected, for different principles, different 
features were associated with gain.  This is why we did not observe strong associations in the first analysis.  
However, it leaves one to wonder what can be said about learning in general regardless of the principle being 
learned.  To address that, a third analysis was conducted.  It is motivated by the findings from the second 
analysis.  It used the same coding as the second analysis, but aggregated the codes across principles in ways 
that were motivated by patterns observed in the second analysis and by the theoretical issues discussed in the 
introduction. 
Insert Table 9 about here. 
Are impasses are associated with learning? 
One of our main questions concerned the effect of impasses on learning.  With the knot principle and the 
compound body principle, impasses were associated with gains.  There appear to be several reasons why no 
such association was observed for the other three principles:  
•  For the rotated axes principle, the test problem did not measure acquisition of the principle taught during 
training, so unfortunately, data from this principle are worthless for testing the impasse hypothesis or any 
other hypothesis.  In fact, they will be ignored in subsequent discussions.    
•  For the deceleration principle, all the learning opportunities began with an impasse.   
•  For the kinematics equation, 22 of the 23 learning opportunities began with an impasse.    
The useable data suggest that impasses increase the likelihood of learning but do not guarantee it.  This is 
evident in Table 10, which presents an analysis of the learning opportunities from four of the five principles (i.e.,   40
data from the rotated axes principle are not included).  The same coding categories were used as in section 4, 
but they were aggregated across principles and according to the definition of impasses as episodes where the 
student got stuck, made an error, or did the correct action while showing signs of uncertainty.   
Insert Table 10 about here 
The association apparent in Table 10 is statistically reliable (c
2(94)=13.4, p=.001) and shows that learning 
opportunities that include an impasse result in gains about half the time, whereas gains are less frequent when 
learning opportunities have the tutor doing the action (21%) or the student doing the action correctly without 
signs of uncertainty (11%).  When students did the correct action without signs of uncertainty despite having 
failed to do so on the pretest, it was mostly on the compound body principle (16 of 22 cases), where the 
problem statement strongly implied that the student should use a compound body.  Thus, it seems that impasses 
are indeed associated with gains because when they are absent, students seldom learn. 
Are explanations more effective in the context of an impasse? 
As Table 9 indicates, explanations, albeit of different kinds, were associated with learning for the 
Deceleration principle and for the Kinematics equation.  Why were explanations not associated with learning for 
the Compound body principle or the Knot principle?   Almost all the learning opportunities of the Deceleration 
and Kinematics principles included impasses, but impasses occurred on only some of the learning opportunities 
for the Compound body and Knot principles.  This suggests that explanations may be more effective in the 
context of an impasse.    
In order to test this, the statistical tests for association were redone for the Compound body and Knot 
principles including only learning opportunities where impasses occurred.    None of the explanation codes were 
reliably associated with gain.  Although this could be due to lack of statistical power, trends were not apparent   41
in the data (see Tables 11 and 12; the cells indicate the number of gains over the total number of learning 
opportunities).   
Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here. 
This suggests that it may be something about the content of the Knot and Compound Body principles that 
makes explanations ineffective.   They do share the common feature that they advise the student which object to 
pick as the body.  This is often quite salient visually, so it may be that some kind of shallow, visual learning 
suffices for transfer to the post-test.  Even if providing explanations encourages deeper learning, the deeper 
learning may be no better than shallow learning at causing transfer to our post-test.     
Is mentioning the goal effective in the context of impasses? 
As discussed in the introduction, mentioning goals ought to be associated with learning at least in some 
cases.  In the earlier analysis, discussion of goals was associated with learning for the Knot principle but not for 
any of the other three principles.  Even for the knot principle, it appears that the association is the result of a 
confound with impasses, as argued in connection with Table 3.  Just to be thorough, we reanalyzed the data for 
the Compound Body and Knot principles, including only learning opportunities where there were impasses.  
Mentioning goals was not associated with gain. 
General discussion 
This section discusses each objective of the research in a separate section. 
Objective 1: Adding detail to our picture of coached problem solving 
One objective was to add detail to the emerging picture of coached problem solving, and in particular, to 
help us envision the learning opportunities for principles that occur during coached problem solving.   For each   42
of the 5 principles, a narrative summary of their learning opportunities was provided in section 4.  In this section, 
we point out some of the similarities among them. 
Learning opportunities can be viewed as consisting of 3 unordered parts.  During the goal setting part, the 
tutor may prompt the student to apply the principle by telling the student what the current goal is.  This occurred 
in 61% of the learning opportunities (see Table 13), counting only the initial application of the Rotated Axes 
principle.  This is a surprisingly high frequency, given that McArthur et al. (1990) found goals mentioned much 
less frequently in their algebra problem solving transcripts.  It may be that their subjects were more familiar with 
the relevant goal management knowledge than our subjects, and thus needed less prompting. 
Insert Table 13 about here 
The second part, initial principle application, consisted of either the student or the tutor applying the 
principle.  In our corpus, it was usually the students who applied the principle.  The tutor applied the principle in 
only 21 (19%) of the 113 learning opportunities (counting only the initial learning opportunities for the rotated 
axis principle).  Students reached an impasse on 67 (59%) of the 113 learning opportunities.  This is not 
surprising given that we studied only learning opportunities where the student missed the principle on the pretest.  
If the student made an error, our tutors always pointed it out if the students didn’t detect it already, which is 
consistent with earlier studies of coached problem solving (e.g., Merrill et al., 1995). 
The third part consists of explanations and other discussion of the principle application.  The tutor 
produced most of the explanations.  We had hoped to see cases where the student provided most of the 
explanation, but this seldom occurred.   For the Deceleration and Kinematics principles, some of the 
explanations consisted of elaborate derivations of the principle.  These were never positively associated with 
gain, and mathematical explanations were inversely associated with gains for the Kinematics principle.  For the   43
other 3 principles, explanations generally did not involve elaborate derivations, possibly because there are none 
for these principles.  Moreover, explanations of these principles were not associated with gain. 
Although the three parts often occurred in the order of goal prompt, initial application and explanation, they 
didn’t always occur in that order.  For instance, sometimes the student would make an attempt to apply the 
principle, then the tutor would prompt by mentioning the goal.  Sometimes tutors included a little bit of the 
explanation (e.g., “Notice that the knot is also an object.”) as a prompt even before the student made a first 
attempt at the goal. 
In short, the picture to take home of a typical learning opportunity in this study is:  The tutor usually 
suggests a goal; the student usually tries to apply the principle and often reaches an impasse; and the tutor gives 
most of the subsequent explanation.  To be frank, there were few cases of the kind of inspired tutoring observed 
by Collins and Stevens (1982), despite the fact that our tutors had years of experience, had great enthusiasm for 
tutoring, and knew that their tutoring was being recorded and analyzed.    
Objective 2: Finding features of tutorial dialog that are associated with learning 
The second objective of this research was to find features of the learning opportunities that were associated 
with learning.  These proved surprisingly elusive.  When we analyzed all the principles together, we found only 
that shorter learning opportunities were associated with more frequent gains.  It could be that shorter 
explanations are more effective,  but it could also be that easily-learned principles elicit shorter discussions.   
When we controlled for principle learnability by analyzing each of 5 principles separately, we did observe 
correlates of learning.  However, different features were associated with the learning of different principles.  The 
knot principle and the compound body principle were learned when students reached impasses, as predicted by 
several earlier studies  (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Carroll & Kay, 1988; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; VanLehn,   44
1987, 1990, 1999; VanLehn & Jones, 1993b; VanLehn et al., 1992).  For the deceleration and the kinematics 
principles, almost all the students reached impasses, so only explanations or goal-prompting could be associated 
with learning.   It turned out that generalization was important for deceleration, which is consistent with 
Carmine’s (1994a) findings.  Contrary to Sleeman et al. (1989), explanation of why the student’s equation was 
wrong may have been important for learning the correct kinematics equation.  Contrary to Catrambone 
(1994b), mathematical derivations of the correct kinematics equation actually hurt learning. 
This diversity of findings prompted a third analysis of the data.  It found that learning was more common at 
impasses than when the tutor did the action correctly or when the student did the action without signs of an 
impasse.  This suggests that letting the student try to do an action even if they will get stuck or make an error is 
better than showing them how to do it.   
Dweck (1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) found that changing reward structures could change students 
from a performance orientation to a learning orientation.  In our studies, when students reach an impasse, they 
discover that they need to learn something, so they may adopt a learning orientation at least for the duration of 
the learning opportunity.  If so, then one would expect explanations and goal prompting to be more effective in 
the context of an impasse than they would otherwise be.  That did not turn out to be the case, although the null 
results could be due to low statistical power. 
Implications 
When all is said and done, what has been learned from this close examination of learning opportunities 
during coached problem solving?  First, impasses appear to be strongly associated with learning.  This suggests 
that tutors should encourage impasses.  Our tutors always gave feedback on errors, unless the students detected 
the errors first, but they should perhaps go even further.  Of the 33 cases just mentioned where there were no   45
impasses, there were 11 cases when tutors applied the principle without even giving the student a chance first.  
Although it is possible that the tutors deliberately avoided the impasses for affective reasons, such as preventing 
the students from losing face, it may also be that the tutors overestimated the students’ competence or were 
more enthusiastic about making progress through the problem than letting the student make mistakes and 
learning from them.  As a general policy, tutors should let impasses occur unless there are compelling reasons 
(e.g., affective ones) for avoiding them.  The other 22 cases of non-impasses occurred mostly when students 
guessed correctly about the compound body due to the way the problem was worded.  These cases could 
perhaps be avoided by rewording the problem.    
The large number of null results for explanations and goal prompting suggest that tutorial explanations and 
other tactics are perhaps much less important than we initially thought.  McKendree (1990) showed that a 
tutoring system that merely flags errors yielded significantly less learning than when it gave hints as well.  
However, most of the benefit seemed to be due to the students learning goal management skills, as opposed to 
principles.  The analyses presented here suggest that tutorial explanations are associated with gains in only a few 
cases.    
If explanations are not associated with learning, then we face the counterintuitive but intriguing possibility 
that the content of the tutor’s comments may not matter much.  The main effect of tutorial explanations may be 
to prompt students to think harder with the knowledge that they already possess.  If so, then it doesn’t matter 
what the tutors say or even whether the students understand it; the mere fact that the tutors are talking about a 
principle motivates the students to think harder about it.  This would explain why individual explanation features 
often did not correlate with learning.     46
This is also consistent with Chi’s recent studies showing that when tutors are prohibited from generating 
explanations and may only give content-free prompts to students, then students learn just as much as when 
tutors are allowed to tutor normally (Chi et al., 2001).  However, Chi’s subjects were reading a textbook 
instead of solving a problem, so her subjects had access to authoritative knowledge, whereas our problem 
solving students never referred to the text while working with the tutor, so their only authoritative source was 
their tutor.  It is not clear whether zero-content prompting will work as well with coached problem solving as it 
does with coached reading.  Moreover, in the prompting condition of Chi’s studies, the prompters may have 
kept prompting the student until the student had produced an explanation that satisfied the prompter.  
Nonetheless, there seems to be a growing suspicion that human tutorial explanations may not be all that helpful 
for students.  Tutorial behavior that gets students to think, such as generating opportunities for impasses or 
giving zero-content prompts, may be the key to why tutoring is so effective.  If a feedback loop is added that 
keeps students thinking and talking until they have produced an explanation that satisfies the tutor, then that 
might further increase the effectiveness of such explanation-free tutoring. 
On the other hand, zero-content prompting probably fails whenever the students simply cannot generate a 
sufficient explanation by themselves.   Renkl (2001) has shown that learning can be improved by providing 
tutorial explanations whenever students fail to generate a correct self-explanation.  
This suggests that an optimal tutoring strategy may be to (a) let the student reach an impasse, (b) prompt 
them to find the right step and explain it, and (c) provide an explanation only if they have tried and failed to 
provide their own explanation.  Human tutors often fail to do step (b) and sometimes even fail to do step (a).  
On the other hand, some intelligent tutoring systems approximate this tutoring strategy in that they always let 
students try to do a step before giving hints on it, and their hint sequences gradually increase in content.    47
However, they do not elicit an explanation from student, nor would they be able to understand it if they did, so 
they do not know when the student’s explanation is satisfactory.  This suggests that the next major advance in 
tutoring technology might be tutors that elicit and understand student explanations (e.g., Rose et al., 2001; 
Vanlehn et al., 2002). 
Given that a tutorial explanation is finally necessary, what kind of explanation should be given?  It turned 
out in this study that explanations that were just deep enough to allow students to solve the post-test problems 
were more effective than deeper explanations.  For instance, on the Deceleration principle, tutors provided 
several interesting explanations for the principle, and sometimes even got students involved in producing parts of 
the explanation.  One would think that this should cause deep learning of the principle.  However, it turned out 
that gains were associated only with stating the principle in a general form (“If an object is moving in a straight 
line and slowing down, then its acceleration is in the opposite direction from its motion.”).  Because the post-test 
problem showed an object moving horizontally and slowing down, while the training problem showed an object 
moving vertically and slowing down, the students only needed to incorporate the key concepts “slowing down” 
and “opposite direction” into their knowledge in order to transfer their training experience to the post-test.  Any 
explanation that went beyond this was simply wasted breath, according to one interpretation of our results.  
Similarly, the mathematical derivations of the Kinematics principle didn’t help; in fact, they were associated with 
less gain.  The explanations of the two body-choice principles, Knot and Compound Body, had no apparent 
benefits for students (even after an impasse, which might have motivated them to attend to the explanations), 
probably because a shallow, visual form of learning would suffice to transfer the training experience to the post-
test.    Lastly, in the initial analysis that aggregated learning opportunities over principles, the only feature that 
was associated with gains was number of words, which suggests that shorter explanations are more effective.    48
These results suggest that when tutors must give an explanation because the student cannot, the tutor’s 
explanation should be as simple and short as possible.  More elaborate explanations, while perhaps beneficial in 
non-tutorial settings, appear to have no benefits in this study.   
To put it in motto form, tutors should “ask more and tell less.”  Although our results are consistent with this 
motto, considerably more research is needed before we really understand how to optimize human tutoring and 
computer-based tutoring.   
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Tables and Figures   50
Figure 1: A solved physics problems 
 
 
 
For the Left Knot: 
￿ F = 0 
￿ Fy = T3y + 0 - W1 
T3y = T3 cos 37 
W1 = 300 
0 = T3 cos 37 - 300 N 
300 N / cos 37 = T3 
T3 = 375.6 
￿ Fx = T3x + T2 = 0 
T3x = -T3 cos 53 
0 = -T3 cos 53 + T2 
T2 = 226 N 
 
For the Right Knot: 
￿ F = 0 
￿ Fx = T2x + T1x 
T1x = T1 cos 37 
￿ Fx = -T2 + T1 cos 37 
T1 = T2 / cos 37 
T1 = 283 N 
￿ Fy = T1 sin 37 - W2 = 0 
T1y = T1 sin 37 
W2 = T1 sin 37 
W2 = 170.3 N 
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Table 1 
General codes 
 
Initiation Codes:   
•  Did the student get stuck or make an error? 
•  Who initiated the discussion: student or tutor? 
•  What initiated the discussion: the student detecting an error, the tutor detecting an error, or the student 
getting stuck? 
Explanation Codes: 
•  How many of the key ideas behind the principle were mentioned by the tutor? By the student? 
•  How many misconceptions were mentioned by the student? By the tutor? 
•  Who first mentioned the correct conclusion generated by applying the principle: the student, the tutor, the 
tutor by splicing words into the student’s incomplete conclusion (Graesser, Person, & Magliano, 1995), the 
student when there was only one plausible choice, or neither? 
•  How many times was the correct conclusion mentioned by the student?  By the tutor? 
Miscellaneous Codes:  
•  Was the action performed by the student without help from the tutor, by the tutor without help from the 
student, or by both? 
•  How many words were uttered by participants during the discussion?   52
 
Table 2  
Codes for the knot principle 
 
Goal Setting Codes: 
•  Did the tutor state that a body needed to be chosen? 
•  Did the tutor ask the student to select a body? 
Initiation Codes: 
•  Did tutor choose the body or did the student try to choose it? 
•  If the student tried to choose the body, did the student choose correctly, incorrectly or get stuck? 
Explanation Codes: 
•  Did the tutor point out that the knot is an object? 
•  If the student chose an incorrect body, did the tutor explain why the choice was wrong (e.g., by 
demonstrating that choosing a weight as a body leads to a dead-end)? 
•  Did the tutor explain why knots should be used as bodies in this problem (e.g., “You want to relate T3 
and W1, and that knot is what you need.” )? 
•  Did the tutor state the principle in general form?   53
 
Table 3 
Relationship between goal setting (rows) and initial application of the principle (columns). 
 
 
T did Error Stuck Ok Total
T ask S to 
choose
0 14 0 2 16
T doesn't 
ask S to 
choose
3 0 1 0 4
T ask S to 
choose
0 0 0 0 0
T doesn't 
ask S to 
choose
8 0 1 3 12
Total 11 14 2 5 32
T says body 
must be chosen
T doesn't say 
body must be 
chosen
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Table 4 
Codes for the deceleration principle 
 
Goal Setting Codes: 
•  Did the tutor ask the student which direction the acceleration goes? 
Initiation Codes: None.  All events were initiated by an error which was caught by the tutor. 
Explanation Codes: 
•  Which line of reasoning (tutorial tactic) was used? 
•  How many lines of reasoning were used? 
•  How many steps were in the line of reasoning, or how many steps were in all lines of reasoning if more 
than one was used? 
•  How many of the steps in the lines of reasoning were explicitly presented (tutors sometimes skipped 
steps)? 
•  How many of the steps in the lines of reasoning were produced by the tutor vs. by the student? 
•  How active was the student (number of steps produced by the student divided by total number of 
steps produced)? 
•  Was a general version of the principle stated? 
Miscellaneous codes: 
•  Did the student draw a correct acceleration vector at the end or merely state that the acceleration was 
upward?   55
 
Table 5 
Codes for the kinematics principle 
 
Goal Setting Codes: 
•  Did the tutor suggest finding a value for a variable? 
•  Did the tutor suggest writing an equation? 
•  Did the tutor suggest writing a kinematics equation? 
Initiation Codes: 
•  Whether the student produced a correct equation, an incorrect equation or no equation. 
Explanation Codes: 
•  Whether the kinematics equation was discussed before or after the value of acceleration was found 
(and thus, could be substituted into the equation).  
•  Whether the tutor asked the student to name or give values for the variables in the equation.  
•  Whether the student used the equation during training to calculate a numerical value for the distance. 
•  If the student produced an incorrect equation, did the tutor explain why it was wrong? 
•  Did the tutor derive the correct equation (s=vot+½ at
2) via calculus or algebra? 
Miscellaneous Codes:  
•  Whether the student gave an incorrect answer on the pre-test or gave no answer on the pre-test. 
•  Whether the student made the same mistake they made on the pre-test.   56
 
Table 6 
Codes for the compound body principle 
 
Goal Setting Codes: 
•  Did the tutor ask the student to choose the body? 
Initiation Codes: 
•  Did the student choose the body incorrectly, correctly but showing uncertainty, or correctly and 
without comment? 
Explanation Codes: 
•  Did the tutor explain that the two blocks can be considered a single body because they move 
together? 
•  Did the tutor make any other explanations (e.g., there is no need to consider internal forces between 
blocks)? 
•  Did the tutor state the principle in a general form? 
Miscellaneous Codes: 
•  Did the student mention mass during the selection of the body (because it might be possible to work 
the problem by simply adding the masses of the two blocks together instead of conceptualizing the pair 
as a single body)?   57
 
Table 7 
Codes used for the rotated axes principle 
 
Goal Setting Codes: 
•  Did the tutor mention that the axis can or should be rotated? 
Initiation Codes: 
•  Did the tutor suggest how much to rotate the axes before giving the student a chance? 
•  Did the student draw rotated axes or non-rotated ones? 
Explanation Codes: 
•  Did the tutor mention the specific version of the principle? 
•  Did the tutor mention the general version of the principle? 
•  Did the tutor mention both versions of the principle? 
Miscellaneous Codes: 
•  If the student drew non-rotated axes, did the tutor explain either the specific or general principle?   58
 
Table 8 
Association of errors on the rotated axis principle with subsequent errors. 
 
  S erred on the second problem? 
S erred on the first problem?  No  Yes 
Yes  7  0 
No  5  3 
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Table 9 
Codes associated with gains 
 
Knot Principle 
•  The student chose an incorrect body (vs. the choosing the correct body or letting the tutor choose 
the body). 
Deceleration principle 
•  The tutor stated a general version of the principle (vs. neither tutor nor student stating a general 
version of the principle). 
A kinematics equation 
•  If the student produced an incorrect equation, the tutor explained why it was wrong (vs. not 
explaining why it was wrong). 
•  The tutor did not use mathematical derivations of the equation (vs. the tutor used an algebraic or 
calculus derivation of the equation).  
Compound body principle 
•  The student chose an incorrect body or chose the correct body but expressed uncertainty (vs. 
choosing the correct body without expressing uncertainty). 
Rotated axes principle 
•  None (probably because the test problem could not be solved with the principle taught during the 
tutoring).   60
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Table 10 
Impasses are associated with gains 
 
  Gain  No-gain 
Impasse: Student gets stuck, errs, or does correct action with uncertainty  33  29 
No impasse: Tutor does correct action    3  11 
No impasse: Student does correct action without signs of uncertainty    2  17 
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Table 11 
For the Knot principle, are explanations in the context of impasses associated with gain? 
 
  Explain  No explain  p(Fisher) 
Tutor points out that the knot is an object  10/13 (77%)  3/3 (100%)  1.0 
Tutor explains why the student’s choice is wrong  8/11 (73%)  5/5 (100%)  0.509 
Tutor explains the general principle  3/5 (60%)  10/11 (91%)  0.214 
Tutor explains why knot is right for this problem  8/8 (100%)  5/8 (63%)  0.200 
   63
 
Table 12 
For the Compound Body principle, are explanations in the context of impasses associated with gain? 
 
  Explain  No explain  p(Fisher) 
Tutor explains: they move together so consider as one  2/3 (67%)  4/6 (67%)  1.0 
Tutor explains the general principle  0/0   6/9 (67%)  N/A 
Tutor gives any other explanation  2/4 (50%)  4/5 (80%)  0.524 
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Table 13 
How frequently did the tutor mention the goal? 
 
Principle  Frequency 
Knot  20/32 (63%) 
Rotated axis    8/18 (44%) 
Deceleration  13/15 (87%) 
Kinematics equation  16/23 (70%) 
Compound body  10/25 (40%) 
Average  61% 
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